From 1755c7564754f0770a6f5304cf54da89dfbdf753 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kagami Sascha Rosylight Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2023 23:07:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] some edits for comments --- .../src/server/oauth/OAuth2ProviderService.ts | 38 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/packages/backend/src/server/oauth/OAuth2ProviderService.ts b/packages/backend/src/server/oauth/OAuth2ProviderService.ts index 8d55929ac4..2f6e2a06fc 100644 --- a/packages/backend/src/server/oauth/OAuth2ProviderService.ts +++ b/packages/backend/src/server/oauth/OAuth2ProviderService.ts @@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify'; // This is also mostly similar to https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/web-server#uri-validation // although Google has stricter rule. function validateClientId(raw: string): URL { - // Clients are identified by a [URL]. + // "Clients are identified by a [URL]." const url = ((): URL => { try { return new URL(raw); } catch { throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must be a valid URL', 'invalid_request'); } })(); - // Client identifier URLs MUST have either an https or http scheme + // "Client identifier URLs MUST have either an https or http scheme" // But then again: // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749.html#section-3.1.2.1 // 'The redirection endpoint SHOULD require the use of TLS as described @@ -53,30 +53,30 @@ function validateClientId(raw: string): URL { throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must be a valid HTTPS URL', 'invalid_request'); } - // MUST contain a path component (new URL() implicitly adds one) + // "MUST contain a path component (new URL() implicitly adds one)" - // MUST NOT contain single-dot or double-dot path segments, + // "MUST NOT contain single-dot or double-dot path segments," const segments = url.pathname.split('/'); if (segments.includes('.') || segments.includes('..')) { throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must not contain dot path segments', 'invalid_request'); } - // (MAY contain a query string component) + // ("MAY contain a query string component") - // MUST NOT contain a fragment component + // "MUST NOT contain a fragment component" if (url.hash) { throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must not contain a fragment component', 'invalid_request'); } - // MUST NOT contain a username or password component + // "MUST NOT contain a username or password component" if (url.username || url.password) { throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must not contain a username or a password', 'invalid_request'); } - // (MAY contain a port) + // ("MAY contain a port") - // host names MUST be domain names or a loopback interface and MUST NOT be - // IPv4 or IPv6 addresses except for IPv4 127.0.0.1 or IPv6 [::1]. + // "host names MUST be domain names or a loopback interface and MUST NOT be + // IPv4 or IPv6 addresses except for IPv4 127.0.0.1 or IPv6 [::1]." if (!url.hostname.match(/\.\w+$/) && !['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '[::1]'].includes(url.hostname)) { throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must have a domain name as a host name', 'invalid_request'); } @@ -91,6 +91,16 @@ interface ClientInformation { } // https://indieauth.spec.indieweb.org/#client-information-discovery +// "Authorization servers SHOULD support parsing the [h-app] Microformat from the client_id, +// and if there is an [h-app] with a url property matching the client_id URL, +// then it should use the name and icon and display them on the authorization prompt." +// (But we don't display any icon for now) +// https://indieauth.spec.indieweb.org/#redirect-url +// "The client SHOULD publish one or more tags or Link HTTP headers with a rel attribute +// of redirect_uri at the client_id URL. +// Authorization endpoints verifying that a redirect_uri is allowed for use by a client MUST +// look for an exact match of the given redirect_uri in the request against the list of +// redirect_uris discovered after resolving any relative URLs." async function discoverClientInformation(httpRequestService: HttpRequestService, id: string): Promise { try { const res = await httpRequestService.send(id); @@ -341,9 +351,8 @@ export class OAuth2ProviderService { const clientUrl = validateClientId(clientID); // TODO: Consider allowing localhost for native apps (RFC 8252) - // The current setup requires an explicit list of redirect_uris per - // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics#section-4.1.3 - // which blocks the support. But we could loose the rule in this case. + // This is currently blocked by the redirect_uri check below, but we can theoretically + // loosen the rule for localhost as the data never leaves the client machine. if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'test' || process.env.MISSKEY_TEST_CHECK_IP_RANGE === '1') { const lookup = await dns.lookup(clientUrl.hostname); if (ipaddr.parse(lookup.address).range() !== 'unicast') { @@ -353,6 +362,9 @@ export class OAuth2ProviderService { // Find client information from the remote. const clientInfo = await discoverClientInformation(this.httpRequestService, clientUrl.href); + + // Requires an explicit list of redirect_uris per + // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics#section-4.1.3 if (!clientInfo.redirectUris.includes(redirectURI)) { throw new AuthorizationError('Invalid redirect_uri', 'invalid_request'); }